A §145 Action May Not Be As Appealing as a Trip to the Federal Circuit

In Nantkwest, Inc. v. Matal, [2016-1794] (June 23, 2017), the Federal Circuit reversed the denial of attorneys fees to the USPTO in successfully defending civil action under 35 USC §145 brought by a patent applicant.  The statute provides that the applicant must pay “[a]ll of the expenses of the proceeding . . . regardless of the outcome.” The district court held that “expenses” did not include attorneys fees.

The Federal Circuit found that the ordinary meaning of “expenses” as defined in dictionaries and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this term lend significant weight to the conclusion that when Congress used the phrase “all expenses,” it meant to include attorneys’ fees.  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held “[a]ll expenses of the proceedings”
under § 145 includes the pro-rata share of the attorneys’ fees the USPTO incurred to defend applicant’s appeal.

The Federal Circuit remanded the case for the district court to enter an additional award of $78,592.50 in favor of the Director.

Although it may seem unfair that an applicant losing an appeal has to pay the Office’s cost in successfully defending the appeal of a rejection, as the Federal Circuit pointed out, this is how Congress chose to allocate the cost of an appeal to the district court.  What is unfair, however, is that this is how Congress chose to allocate the cost of an applicant’s successful appeal of an improper rejection as well.  Thus, an applicant faced with an improper rejection who brings an action under §145 and wins, is still on the hook for the Patent Office’s attorneys fees.  This unfair result alone might suggest that Congress did not intent to include attorneys’ fees in “expenses,” otherwise Congress is putting a high price on justice.

So why would an applicant chose to take a PTAB decision to district court, rather than appeal to the Federal Circuit?  The principal reason is that the PTAB may have pointed out an evidentiary defect in the applicant’s case.  If the applicant appeals to the Federal Circuit the record is fixed, and if the PTAB was correct about the defect, the Federal Circuit will simply affirm the PTAB.  However, in an action under §145 the applicant can introduce additional evidence, for example a declaration by the inventor, or by an expert, or perhaps even evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness.  This could allow the applicant to obtain a patent, when an appeal would otherwise be futile.  Depending upon the importance of the invention, this might well be worth an additional $78,000 or so.

However is a §145 action the only way to obtain this result?  Perhaps not.  One might assume that if you do not appeal the PTAB decision that it becomes final and res judicata will prevent the application from ever getting the claims that the were the subject of the appeal. This would be a good reason to pursue the §145 action.  However, the underlying assumption may be wrong.  In In re Donohue, 226 USPQ 619 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Office should not apply res judicata where the applicant made a different record, for example by supplying a new affidavit or declaration:

Appellant has made a record different from that in Donohue I by submitting the Fields affidavit. This new record presents a new issue of patentability with respect to whether the previously sustained anticipation rejection can still be maintained. In view of this new issue, the PTO properly declined to make a formal res judicata rejection . . .

226 USPQ 621.  As long as Donohue remains good law, a patent applicant can file an RCE or even a continuation, supplement its records, and continue to prosecute claims whose rejection was affirmed by the PTAB (and not have to spend $80,000 on the the USPTO’s expenses in a §145 action.

It is still unfair that a successful applicant in a §145 action has to pay for the unsuccessful efforts of the USPTO in defending an improper rejection, but at least the applicant has an alternative route to continue to pursue the claims after an unsuccessful appeal to the PTAB.

Motivation to Enforce Patent Rights Does Not Make Case Exceptional

Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v, All-Tag Security S.A., [2016-1397] (June 5, 2017), the Federal Circuit reversed the award of attorneys fees.

Checkpoint sued under U.S. Patent No. 4,876,555 relates to improved anti-theft tags that are attached to merchandise.  After a jury trial, the patent was found not infringed, invalid, and unenforceable, and the court found the case to be “exceptional” because   Checkpoint’s expert witness based his infringement opinion on examination of imported tags that were manufactured by All–Tag in Switzerland, although the
accused tags were manufactured by All–Tag in Belgium.  The Federal Circuit reversed the attorney fee award because there was evidence that the Swiss products were made on the same machines and the Belgian products.  Certiorari was granted, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with Octane Fitness and Highmark.  The district court agreed that Checkpoint’s claims were not frivolous, but nonetheless found the case to be exceptional, explaining: frivolousness is not required to find exceptionality under Section 285.  The district court’s determination was based upon three findings: (1) Checkpoint’s motivation in bringing the lawsuit, (2) inadequate pre-suit investigation, and (3) the failure of Checkpoint’s expert to inspect the correct accused product.

As the Checkpoints motivation, the Federal Circuit said that enforcement of the statutory right to exclude is not an “exceptional case” under §285.  While the Federal Circuit agreed that “motivation” to harass or burden an opponent may be relevant to an “exceptional
case” finding, “motivation to implement the statutory patent right by bringing suit based on a reasonable belief in infringement is not an
improper motive.”  The Federal Circuit found no evidence of harassment or abuse, and noted that Checkpoint’s claim survived summary judgment and a Daubert hearing.

The district court also found the expert’s failure to test an accused product supported the exceptional case finding and fee award.  The Federal Circuit noted that there no representation by All–Tag that the accused products were different from the tested products, and the district court did not so find.  Thus the failure to test the accused products did  not support an exceptional case ruling.

Denial of Attorneys’ Fees Reversed because District Court Conflated Rule and 35 USC 285

In Rothschild Connected Devices  Innovations, LLC v. Guardian Protection Services, Inc., [2016-2521] (June 5, 2017), the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the determination that Appellee Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC had not engaged in conduct sufficient to make the litigation “exceptional.”

Rothschild’s sued ADS, alleging that ADS’s home security system infringes U.S. Patent No. 8,788,090.  ADS responded that the ’090 patent covers patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that prior art anticipates claim 1 of the ’090 patent, an offered to settle if Rothschild paid ADS its attorneys fees and costs of $43,330.  When Rothschild rejected the offer, ADS next filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and sent Rothschild a “Safe Harbor Notice” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2).  In response, Rothschild voluntarily moved to dismiss its action, and ADS opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for attorneys fees pursuant to § 285.

The District Court granted Rothschild’s Motion to Dismiss and denied ADS’s Cross-Motion for attorneys’ fees, finding that Rothschild did
not engage in conduct sufficient to make the action “exceptional”
under § 285, noting that Rothschild’s decision to voluntarily withdraw its
complaint within the safe harbor period is the type of reasonable conduct Rule 11 is designed to encourage.

The Federal Circuit found the denial of attorneys’ fees was an abuse of discretion.  The Federal Circuit found that the district court clearly erred by failing to consider Rothschild’s willful ignorance of the prior art.  The Federal Circuit further found that the district court misjudged Rothschild’s conduct in the other litigation is brought.  Finally the Federal Circuit found that the district court improperly conflated Rule 11 with 35 U.S.C. § 285.

The Federal Circuit remanded the case for further consideration of the attorneys’ fees reward by the district court.

 

In Determining Whether a Case “Stands Out,” It was Not Improper to Consider Patent Cases Generally

In Nova Chemicals Corp. (Canada) v. Dow Chemical Co., [2016-1576] (May 11, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the case was “exceptional” under 35 USC 285, and the award of $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees.

After a patent infringement trial which resulted in a $61 million award to Dow, in a proceeding for supplemental damages, the patent was found to be invalid for indefiniteness.  After uncovering what it claimed was evidence of fraud on the part of Dow and its counsel, Nova filed an action for relief from the initial judgment. The district court dismissed the action, and Dow sought sanctions and attorneys fees under 35 USC 285.  The district agreed with Dow finding NOVA’s claims for relief “just didn’t stand
up” and were “not even plausible.”

The Federal Circuit found nothing exceptional in the mere fact that NOVA filed a separate action because that was the only option available to challenge the earlier judgment.  However,  the Federal Circuit found that the substantive strength of a NOVA’s position could, and did, independently support an exceptional-case determination.

Nova also argued that it was error to compare the case to all patent cases, pointing out with this baseline an action to set aside a prior judgment would always be exceptional because, by necessity,it would
“stand out” from the traditional patent infringement case.  The Federal Circuit decline to hold that the district court erred in comparing this case to other patent cases more generally.  The Federal Circuit found that any concern regarding the district court’s comparison was tempered by the fact that it did not hold that this case stood out merely because NOVA requested that a prior judgment be set aside.

 

 

Inventorship Claims That Took $8 Million to Defeat Were Not “Exceptional”

In University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V., [2016-1336] (March 23, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the case was not exceptional March 23, 2017, within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 285 and denying Max Planck’s motion for $8 million in attorney fees.

Dr. Thomas Tuschl and his colleagues published an article describing their various discoveries in the field of RNAi. Less than a month later,
Dr. Brenda Bass, of the University of Utah published a mini-review that summarized the state of RNAi research, focusing on Dr. Tuschl’s
article.  Dr. Tuschl read Dr. Bass’ minireview, recognized her hypothesis that 3’ overhangs may be relevant to RNAi, and tested that hypothesis, and made the claimed invention.

The University of Utah sued Max Plank claiming that its employee, Dr. Bass was a co-inventor.  The claim of joint inventorship turned on
alleged collaboration between Dr. Bass and the Tuschl that occurred over several conversations at various academic conferences.  The Federal Circuit listed a number of admissions during Dr. Bass’ deposition that directly contradicted the University of Utah’s allegations that Dr. Bass collaborated with the Tuschl II inventors. The Federal Circuit noted that the only supported allegation was that Dr. Bass and Dr. Tuschl met for dinner during a conference.

The district court reasoned that there was no evidence to support a finding of collaboration between Dr. Bass and Tuschl.  While Dr. Bass’ mini-review was integral to the Tuschl inventors’ research, the mini-review was in the public domain by the time Tuschl relied on it. The district court concluded that Tuschl’s reliance on the mini-review could not, on its own, support a finding of collaboration, and was not included to find that the discussions at an academic conference could constitute the collaboration needed to establish joint inventorship.

Max Planck sought eight million dollars in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, arguing that the case was “exceptional” because (1) in light of Dr. Bass’ deposition testimony, the University of Utah lacked any meaningful basis for filing its correction of inventorship suit; (2) the University of Utah’s delay in withdrawing its sole inventorship claim until the eve of summary judgment indicates that it knew its claim was meritless; and (3) the University of Utah’s claimed damages
were extortionately high.

The district court found that it was clear that Dr. Bass’ review played some role in the invention, rejecting the first grounds.  One the second point the district court actually credited the University for withdrawing its sole inventorship claim early.  On the last point the district court declined to find anything exceptional about the University of Utah’s position: “Although Utah may have been asking for pie in the sky, that does not differentiate this case from most patent cases.”

The Federal Circuit found that the district court provided a thorough explanation for why it did not find this case to be exceptional.  Noting that there is no precise Octane Fitness frame-work, the Federal Circuit said that the district court explained why the University of Utah’s position did not stand out from other patent cases, and Octane Fitness does not require anything more.  The Federal Circuit concluded:

The trial judge was in the best position to understand and weigh these issues. She had no obligation to write an opinion that reveals her assessment of every consideration. This court will not second guess her determination.

Although it played no role in the appeal, one has to wonder whether the $8 million in attorneys’ fees requested by Max Plank, which the district court called “jaw-dropping,” figured into the district court’s evaluation of the claim.  When the district court said that “it is not grossly unjust to require Max Planck to bear its own costs,”  was the court thinking that if it really took $8 million to defeat the University’s claims on Summary Judgment, were they really so exceptional?

 

An Objectively Reasonable Case Can Still be Exceptional

In Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agriscience LLC, [2015-1854] (March 17, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees under 35 USC 285 to Dow, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the case exceptional.

In its decision awarding attorney fees, the district judge found that Bayer’s arguments were “fallacious” because they were “implausible” and “made no business sense” in light of the facts surrounding the agreements and their negotiation.  The Federal Circuit noted the conflicting testimony of one of Bayer’s executives, and inconsistent emails to Bayer’s position that Dow was not licensed to commercially exploit Bayer’s genetically modified soybeans.

The Federal Circuit noted that abuse of discretion is a highly deferential standard.  It said that the district court applied the correct legal test under § 285, examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the case stood out from others. The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s opinion thoroughly demonstrated the totality-of-the circumstances approach, detailing the reasons why Bayer’s positions on the merits and litigation tactics coalesced in making this case, in its judgment, exceptional.

The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that Bayer had an objectively reasonable case on the merits, noting that Octane Fitness established that whether a party’s merits position was objectively reasonable is not dispositiveunder § 285. The Federal Circuit noted that the district court considered factors beyond the merits—including Bayer’s litigation conduct—and emphasized that Bayer’s conduct in litigating this case in the face of evidence that contradicted its contorted reading of the Agreement was objectively unreasonable.  In the words of the district court “Bayer marched onward with a view of its case that was not supported by its witnesses.”

The Federal Circuit  approved pre-suit diligence as a factor in the totality-of the-circumstance approach, and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bayer failed to perform a diligent presuit investigation of its claims against Dow.  Rejecting Bayer’s other arguments, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court.

Are All Troll Cases Exceptional?

In Iris Connex, LLC, v. Dell, Inc., [2:15-cv-1915-JRG] (January 25, 2016), district judge Gilstrap, after granting summary judgment to Dell, awarded attorneys fees, noting Dell’s arguments that Iris Connex’s claim construction position was unsupportable, that its infringement position was not plausible, that its litigation was primarily settlement driven; and Iris Connex was an intentionally empty shell company and, as a consequence, had no capacity to pay such fees even if the case were ultimately declared to be exceptional.

Judge Gilstrap took the extraordinary step of ordering further discovery into the extended identity of Iris Connex, because the court was concerned that the structure would effectively avoid any deterrence from an award of attorneys fees.  In Judge Gilstrap’s words “[a]s the post-judgment discovery progressed, it became obvious that Iris Connex was not simply a non-practicing entity seeking to vindicate its patent rights—albeit with an
exceptionally bad infringement case.”  Judge Gilstrap found that Iris Connex is the first level of two shell corporations which were intended to shield the real actor, Mr. Brian Yates, from personal liability. Judge Gilstrap found that Mr. Yates and those in active concert with him exploited the corporate form to operate largely in secret and to insulate the true party in interest from the risk associated with dubious infringement suits—that risk being fee shifting under Section 285.

Judge Gilstrap made 28 specific findings, including:

  • Iris Connex has no assets except for the ’950 patent and it holds no working capital.
  • Iris Connex has no employees.
  • Iris Connex was formed for the sole purpose of enforcing its lone asset.
  • Iris Connex paid no cash value for the ’950 patent.
  • Iris Connex pays no rent, (and shares its office with 15 to 20 other entities owned directly or indirectly by Brian Yates,
  • There is no sign for Suite 600-A displayed on any door in the building
    identifying Iris Connex as an occupant.

After a detailed analysis of the law, Judge Gilstrap identified a general and uncontroversial principle: that the corporate form cannot be used as a shield to insulate officers and parent corporations against liability for
their own tortious conduct or tortious conduct they control.  Judge Gilstrap rejected a narrow view of his authority to award fees under Section 285.

Judge Gilstrap noted said that the case “crossed the Rubicon of exceptionality” when the Court concluded that Iris Connex’s case was so weak from the outset that it lacked any real merit. Judge Gilstrap has “its fair share of claim construction arguments” and found that Iris Connex’s “clearly stand out.”

Moreover Judge Gilstrap’s finding of exceptionality was not based solely on the weak merits of the case, or litigation conduct.  Judge Gilstrap found two additional factors supported the finding:  First, that Mr. Yates made an intentional decision to create and undercapitalize Iris Connex as an empty shell, and second, the admitted sloppiness in prosecuting this case, brought about predominantly by Mr. Yates.  Judge Gilstrap found and held Iris Connex and Mr. Yates are jointly and severally liable for $355,000 of fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.

Not finished dispensing Eastern District of Texas justice, Judge Gilstrap also sanctioned one of the more culpable counsel $25,000, and Mr. Yates an additional $152,000.