In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, [2016-1795](September 13, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirm the district court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
on the asserted claims of the ’462 patent.
A jury found the asserted claims of 7,810,144 and 7,120,462 infringed and not invalid, and the district court denied Motorola’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Federal Circuit found substantial evidence supported the validity of the ‘144 patent, but not infringement, and that substantial evidence supported the validity and infringement of the ‘462 patent.
Motorola argued that the district court erred in denying judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claim of the ’144 patent was invalid for lack of written description. In particular, Motorola contended that the specification of the ’144 patent excludes “long-term” or “permanent” storage of the data being transmitted on an intervening computing
device, while claim 41 covers embodiments that nevertheless
use such long-term or permanent storage, in violation of the written description requirement.
The Federal Circuit noted that the claim language neither plainly includes nor plainly excludes long-term or permanent storage, finding that the limitations must be construed in view of the specification. The Federal Circuit noted that paradoxically, Motorola contends that the specification excludes long-term or permanent storage from the scope of the invention, while simultaneously arguing that claim 41 should be read to cover such storage. The Federal Circuit instructed that the proper result is not that claim 41 fails for lack of written description but that it should be construed “in view of the specification” to be limited. The Federal Circuit reiterated its precedent that it is incorrect to construe the claims contrary to the specification, and then to hold the claims invalid because they are contrary to the specification.
After concluding that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict of no invalidity with respect to the claim of the ’144 patent, the Federal Circuit turned to the question of whether there was substantial evidence of direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The Federal Circuit said that to use a system for purposes of infringement, a party must put the invention
into service, i.e., control the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred when it found an infringing use based on the generalized benefit of using the accused system, rather than finding a benefit from each element of the system, and reversed the finding of infringement.